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“Trauma and the Limits of Redemptive Critique: Interrogating the Haunting 
Voices of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution” 
 
Karl P. Benziger and Richard R. Weiner 
 
The authors continue to test the limits of Emile Durkheim/Maurice Halbwachs approach 
to collective identity in the experiences of trauma, shame, and yearning related to the ill-
fated Hungarian Revolution. In a more poststructuralist vein the authors move from a 
focus on piacular subjectivity to one of baroque subjectivity, especially in understanding 
the October 2006 fiftieth anniversary commemorations of the Revolution in Budapest. 
Specifically, what indexical undercurrents of disposition persist and can not be ignored in 
attempts at redemptive critique, as well as in colonized nostalgia and the re-enactment of 
pathos. To what extent do the commemorations of the 1956 Revolution reveal an 
incomplete text of haunting voices open to diverse re-assembling and contesting 
narratives? Beyond the mourning, Walter Benjamin asked, can we transcend the 
spectacle of shared suffering, shared melancholy and shared atonement in interrogating a 
text of presence and absence? Can we do so in a meaningful and knowing participation in 
the tragic, not as a closed drama based on myth, but as an incomplete and unfolding 
drama? Such a text can be interpellated through ongoing redemptive critique rather than 
imbedded in redemptive finality. This redemptive critique characterized by a collective 
conscience of how history might have been different.  
 
I 
 
The fiftieth anniversary commemoration of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution offered the 
promise of a redemptive moment that inextricably linked the nation to the liberal ideals 
expressed in the failed Revolutions of 1848 and 1956. Justice had been delivered in the 
form of the Republic established on October 23, 1989 and Hungary was now part of the 
European Union after a tortured journey that had included alliances and occupations by 
both Germany and the Soviet Union. And yet, the days surrounding the event were 
marked by an unleashing of the furies marked by riots and a bitter resurrection of 
memories of treachery and terror. Why such tumult in the days leading up to and during 
the commemorations?1  
 
Imre Nagy a founding member of the Stalinist state in Hungary gained immense 
popularity among students and workers after 1953 for his reforms known as the New 
Course following the death of Joseph Stalin. He became Prime Minister of Hungary 
1953-1955 and his calls for democracy in the context of a one party state seemed radical 
in comparison with the repressive state that had preceded him. His rivals brought him 
down in 1955 and he was ousted from the communist party. His continued critique of 
Stalinist politics after his ouster demonstrated the limited potency of his enemies and in 
the radicalized atmosphere of October 1956 students demanded that he be returned to 
power in the context of a multiparty state, a political concept he considered anathema. 
The outbreak of the Revolution ensured his return to power, but he only gradually joined 
                                                 
1
 The case for this study stems from Karl Benziger, Imre Nagy Martyr of the Nation: Contested History, 
Legitimacy, and Popular Memory in Hungary (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008) 151-166. 
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with the Revolutionary’s conception of a multi party state. Although he forcefully 
defended the legitimacy of the Revolution after its failure he went to his death on June 
16, 1958 proclaiming his faith in communism. He was buried anonymously after his 
execution as were approximately 400 other persons accused of counterrevolution who 
suffered juridical murder at the hands of the state. 
 
Opposition to the Soviet backed state that was established after the Revolution was 
premised on the concept that the Revolution was in fact, a counterrevolution. A host of 
factors accounted for the ending of the one party state that included a worsening economy 
and Mikhail Gobachev’s policy of glasnost and perestroika, but perhaps the most potent 
weapon wielded by reformers within the communist party and those in opposition outside 
the party was the demand that Imre Nagy be reburied.  
 
The funeral of Imre Nagy on June 16, 1989 can be seen as a critical moment in the 
Hungarian transition to a democratic republic as it explicitly undermined the moral and 
political authority of the communist government then in power. This Nagy memorial 
signified a longing for a national identity tied to the spirit of republicanism that had been 
thwarted in 1956 and had roots going back to 1848. The unity of purpose displayed by 
the Hungarian people at the funeral brings to mind Emile Durkheim’s analysis of 
piaculum and the conscience collective. This is what the sociologist, Robert Bellah 
described as how a society interprets its historical experience in light of a transcendent 
reality.2 In this case study of the Nagy memorial, the republican spirit emerges as a 
possible transcendent social movement that fills the collective conscience.  
  
For Emile Durkheim, piacular rites emerge:  
  
• where the trauma of collective misfortune is valorized as an intensely cathectic 
basis of identity [transcendent signifier];  
  
• where propitiatory sacrifice associated with the trauma reveal a need for self-
negation felt by the community [i.e.: through atonement practices]; and  
  
• where the metaphoric shared “drinking of the blood” generates a “collective 
effervescence” that restores sacred identity and mutual recognition of stabilizing 
social bonds [i.e.: through sacralizing imagery].  
  
Piacular subjectivity is the collective experience of those moments revealed in specified 
collective representations. The concept can be understood as a collection of 
representations mutually created (“phenomenologically constituted”) by a particular 
community as [1] normative attachments and commitments in a public language; and as 
[2] reconstructable chains of practices and practical reasoning. The piacular moments 
reveal what Durkheim called the collective conscience. 
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 Robert Bellah, The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial (New York: Seabury 
Press, 1975) 3. 
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Commemoration in Hungary is marked by the fusion of personal and public memorial 
rituals that often provide an appearance of solidarity reminiscent of Durkheim’s concept 
of piacular ritual. Indeed this concept is useful in examining the legitimizing power of 
Nagy’s funeral in 1989, but it obscures the divisive dialogue that informed the political 
actors and the volatile politics that have continued to intensify after the establishment of 
the Republic on October 23, 1989, as exemplified by the fiftieth anniversary 
commemoration of the Revolution. Commemorations reveal a constructed reality 
advantageous to those with the upper hand.3 The commemoration is only enhanced when 
the moment reflects a point of drama or effervescent moment that Durkheim referred to 
and serves to shroud competing narratives. Nagy’s funeral provided a moment of 
atonement for the politics of cooptation that marked communist politics in Hungary after 
the Revolution. After enacting a brutal terror Nagy’s successor Jánós Kádar demanded 
silence about the Revolution in exchange for a limited economic liberalism that was the 
envy of the other satellite states in the Soviet sphere. Dissent existed but was suborned 
not only by Soviet occupation but by economic possibilities and a certain freedom of 
movement that ultimately included travel to the West. Widespread dissent in Hungary 
gained momentum only after 1985 and included many who had collaborated or had been 
coopted by the regime. 
 
The political and economic transition in Hungary was marked primarily by negotiation; 
events such as Nagy’s funeral provided the legitimacy the opposition needed to drive the 
communists from power. History was rewritten to accord with the establishment of the 
Republic, but beyond Nagy’s funeral and a referendum that created a level playing field 
by stripping the communist party of power there was no political process that would 
provide an accounting for the trauma and shame that had gripped the nation. This fact all 
but ensured that political parties would call upon an arrangement of past events that 
damned their opponents and legitimized their own political fortune. To many belonging 
to the center right factions Nagy and many of his confederates are problematic because of 
their earlier association with Stalinist politics. Nagy’s role in creating a Stalinist State 
was shrouded by his martyrdom and the symbolic role his funeral played. The devotion 
of Nagy and many of his confederates to communism seems contrary to those interested 
in creating a liberal economy. At the same time center left coalitions view Nagy’s 
policies as precursors to the western oriented social democratic state that they wish to 
create. The selection of heroes and stories from the Revolution that highlight or diminish 
the role of the communists or other political factions is central to political grandstanding 
in contemporary Hungary. Was the Revolution the work of reform communists within the 
party or those who remained loyal to the short lived Republic established in 1945?   
 
The hope that ushered forth with the Republic was soon dampened by a worsening 
economy and austerity measures that ultimately left close to a million Hungarians 
                                                 
3
 See John Bodnar’s discussion of public memory in “Public Memory in an American City: 
Commemoration in Cleveland” in Commemorations: The Politics of National Memory, edited by John R. 
Gillis (Prineceton: Princeton University Press, 1994) 75. See also Katherine Verdery’s discussion of the use 
of dead bodies by the elite in post Socialist societies to create new meaning in The Political Lives of Dead 
Bodies: Reburial and Post Socialist Change (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) 50-51 and 
Patrick H. Hutton, “Sigmund Freud and Maurice Halbwachs: The Problem of Memory in Historical 
Psychology,” The History Teacher, 27, 2 (February, 1994): 150.  
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unemployed. The return of the Socialist Party to power in 1992 was premised largely on 
economic pain and a certain nostalgia for the Kádar era’s social safety net. Parliament 
changed hands with each election until 2002. The unprecedented re election of the 
Socialist Party and revelations regarding Hungary’s economy all set in the context of 
2006 ensured that the fiftieth anniversary commemorations would become ensnared in 
this debate about the past. The volatility of this debate moves us from a focus on piacular 
subjectivity to one of a Baroque subjectivity. Baroque has several meanings that includes 
the bizarre and at the same time evokes the multi layered voices of a fugue. This paper 
centers on the many voices revealed by the fiftieth commemoration in the assembling and 
reassembling of contested narratives related to the 1956 Revolution and Hungary’s 
unsavory twentieth century past.         
 
II 
 
The spectacle of Nagy’s reburial on June 16, 1989 undermined the moral authority of the 
communist government and can be analyzed as a contested narrative on the power to 
suppress and the power to actualize republicanism in terms of Emile Durkheim’s analysis 
of piacular rituals and the collective conscience. As a collective celebration of the 
vértanuk (blood witnesses) Nagy and those reburied with him provided contrast to the 
Soviet backed regime then in power, and thus, deadly attachment to the Soviet backed 
counter-revolution.   
  
This first level of meaning revealed by the funeral, though important as a contingent 
factor of political change, tends to downplay the more complicated narrative of this 
political history. The effervescent moment of unity displayed by the Hungarian polity 
certainly contributed to a referendum decision that stripped the party of power. This 
moment was short lived, however, as evidenced by debate over the nature of the state, 
haunted throughout by memories of the Revolution and Hungary’s tumultuous twentieth 
century past. What was the meaning of Nagy’s symbolic status in a country whose 
revolutionary spirit had been largely subdued and co-opted by the socialist “prosperity” 
that separated Hungary from other satellites under Soviet thrall? In this guise, historical 
attachment needed to be found in the events leading up to the Revolution or prior to the 
ascension of the Stalinists in 1948. As we have briefly reviewed, the example of Nagy 
who had played a key role in the establishment of the Stalinist state is problematic to the 
kind of heroic narrative used to legitimize various contemporary political factions, 
especially those that view the political transition of 1989 as the triumph of the capitalist 
model. Historical memory in this light is selective. 
  
The political scientist Katherine Verdery claims that Nagy’s symbolic magnetism can be 
found in his power to legitimate a diverse number of platforms [both negatively and 
positively].4 According to Verdery, Nagy has legitimating effects “not because everyone 
agrees on [his] meaning but because it compels interest despite divergent views of what 
                                                 
4
 The anthropologist Clifford Geertz discusses the importance of charismatic figures in their ability to 
stimulate both negative and positive political dialogue in his seminal essay “Centers, Kings, and Charisma: 
Reflections on the Symbolics of Power” in Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthroplogy 
(New York: Basic Books, 1973) 121-146.  
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[he signifies].5 Because of this, Verdery claims that she is “not interested in the shared 
mentalities found in the conscience collective, but for conflict among groups over social 
meanings.”6 But is it not possible that the shared mentalities that Durkheim found in the 
conscience collective are a result of, or a manifestation of continuing discourse regarding 
the various social frames under consideration?  
  
Jay Winter underscores the importance of affect -- how the ritual associated with World 
War I memorials served both the purpose of commemoration and the possibility of 
forgetting. Citing Sigmund Freud’s discussion of melancholia, he reasons that forgetting 
helps create the boundaries necessary for one suffering from melancholia to once again 
look forward rather than remain locked in grief.7 In this light, perhaps the funeral of Imre 
Nagy created the possibility settling the past and looking towards the future, or more 
cynically as an attempt to lock out the past. For example, political factions associated 
with the former communist regime or those to whom Marx is anathema. As noted earlier, 
however, forgetting and selective remembering stimulates discourse as well as contest of 
the memory narrative.  
 
Winter’s discussion also underlines a limitation of structuralist theory as formulated by 
Durkheim in that his theory relies on a collective conscience determined by social facts 
that exist externally to the individual. 
 
Durkheim associates epistemological and phenomenological connotations with the 
collective conscience which enables him to employ this concept in explaining moral 
obligation. 
  
With respect to its epistemological meaning, the collective conscience according to 
Durkheim refers to: 
 
(1)  a conscience “which is shared in common with our group (i.e., a particular social 
entity) in its entirety, which, consequently, is not oneself, but society living and acting 
within us.”8  
  
(2)  a conscience of shared moral meanings, i.e., the awareness and sharing of moral 
norms derived from symbolic representations engendered collectively;9 and 
  
(3)  a conscience which “by definition is diffused throughout the whole society, but it 
nevertheless has specific features which make it a distinct reality.”10  
  
                                                 
5
 Katherine Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Post Socialist Change (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999) 31. 
6
 Ibid., 36. 
7
 Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 113-114. 
8
 Emile Durkheim, Division of Labor, George Simpson, trans. (New York: Macmillan, 1933) 151. 
9
 See Ernest Wallwork, Durkheim: Morality and Milieu (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972) 35-
36. 
10
 Durkheim, Division of Labor, 79-80. 
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As for the various qualitatively distinct phenomenological experiences associated to such 
a conscience of collective norms, Durkheim notes: 
  
(1)  that the projections of the collective conscience are experienced as an echo in 
ourselves of a force which is foreign to us, and which is superior to what we are;11  
  
(2)  that these projections are experiences 
            (a)  impersonally 
            (b)  objectively (as they are external to the associated individuals of a social    
                   entity12        
(c)  as obligatory, i.e., these collective norms function as moral constraints13        
       which have an “imperative character;”14 they “exercise a sort of ascendancy 
       over the will which feels constrained to conform to them.15  
  
(3)  that the moral experience comprises                                              
                (a)  the perception of collective representations, and 
                (b)  the internalization of collective norms;16 and 
  
(4)  that such collective norms may be internalized differently and hence may affect 
individual members of society very differently.17 
                                     
The sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, a student of Durkheim, saw the collective 
conscience as fluid. Asserting that, “what we can know of the remembered past depends 
entirely upon its commemorative leavings.”18  
 
                                                 
11
 Wallwork, op. cit., 35. 
12
 Durkheim, “La Science positive de la morale en Allemagne,” Revue philosophique, v. xxiv, 134. 
13
 Ibid., 56. 
14
 Durkheim, “Cours de science sociale: Revu internationale de lénseignement, XV, 48. Cited and 
translated by Steven Lukes, Emile Durkheim (London: Allen Lane, 1973) 42. This passage is from the 
opening lecture of Durkheim’s first course at the University of Bordeaux entitled “La solidaite sociale.” 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Wallwork, op. cit., 36. 
17
 Collective representations in Durkheim’s scheme do not constitute the social reality itself; they are only 
the projections, only the manifestations of it. Such typical manifestations of collective life include: moral 
rules, precepts, religious beliefs and practices, juridical codes, myths folklore, proverbs, popular sayings, 
and language. These collective representations, he indicates, “cannot form a circle closed upon itself, the 
source whence they derive must be found outside them. Either the conscience collective floats in the void, 
like a sort of inconceivable absolute, or it is connected with the rest of the world through the intermediary 
substratum on which, in consequence, it depends. On the other hand, of what can this substratum be 
composed if not of the members of society as they are socially combined.” Cited by Lukes, op. cit., 231 
(from a review on Antonio Labriola in Revue Philosophique, XLIV in 1897, 645-651; cf. Peter Winch, The 
Idea of Social Science (London: 1958) 23. That substratum to which collective representations are attached 
are what Durkheim labels institutions: recognized normative patterns or social bonds. And this notion gave 
rise to his development of “depth levels” of social reality.  
18
 From Patrick H. Huttan’s excellent discussion of Halbwachs in his article “Sigmund Freud and Maurice 
Halbwachs: The Problem of Memory in Historical Psychology,” The History Teacher, 27, 2 (February, 
1994): 149. 
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According to Halbwachs each generation must reinterpret the past in the context of the 
present in order to come to a collective understanding of the event or person under 
study.19 His seminal study entitled, “The Legendary Topography of the Gospels” 
provides an historical case study of how contemporary understandings and needs over 
time created sites of memory in Jerusalem that would accord with the stories laid out in 
the four gospels. Importantly, Halbwachs claimed that in spite of differences found in the 
stories of the gospels themselves, they represent a collection of memories held in 
common [traces of history]. Legitimacy of the sites rests in how closely they remain to 
the gospel, not the historical reality of the site itself.20 As Lewis Coser reminds us in his 
introduction to Halbwachs’ work on collective memory, “the past is always a compound 
of persistence and change.”21  
  
Halbwachs’ presentist approach recognized the continuing discourse that surrounds 
issues of memory. As historian Patrick H. Hutton asserts “memory is a function of power 
to determine the way the past is to be represented…setting scholarship on a genealogical 
course.”22 Addressing the construct of power Barry Schwartz asserts that collective 
memory has an “orientational function…being both a mirror…and model for society.”23 
Unlike Durkheim Halbwachs’ approach to collective memory considered groups rather 
than attempting to create universals. In this guise collective memory is multifaceted and 
can be an “effective marker of social differentiation.”24 Seen in this light the funeral 
signified the republican spirit infused with the demand for a sovereign state and at the 
same time stimulated “discourse and argument” regarding the meaning of the 1956 
Revolution and its relationship to Hungarian politics in 1989 that was temporarily 
subdued during the funeral.25  
 
                                                 
19
 Jeffrey K. Olick and Joyc Robbins, “Social Memory Studies: From ‘Collective Memory’ to the Historical 
Sociology of Mnemonic Practices,” Annual Review of Sociology, 24 (1998): 109, 123. The author’s point to 
the connections between Halbwachs, Edward Schils, and Benedict Anderson in regad to generational 
memory. Edward Schils asserts that younger generations define themselves in contrast to earlier 
generations and both authors underscore the importance of youth in nationalist movements. See: Benedict 
Anderson, Imagined Communisties: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: 
Verso, 1991) and Edward Schils, Tradition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981).  
20
 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, Translated and Edited, Lewis A.Coser (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1992) see: “The Legendary Topography of the Gospels in the Holy Land,” 
especially, 194, 231-235.  
21
 Ibid., 26. 
22
 According to Hutton the historians job is to “trace present ideas retrospectivelt” in “Sigmund Freud and 
Maurice Halbwachs,”150. 
23
 See Barry Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2000) 18-19 and Olick and Robbins discussion, “Social Memory Studies,”124. 
24
 Olick and Robbins, 111. 
25
 The speeches at the funeral were remarkably similar calling for Hungarian sovereignty, democracy, and 
the withdrawal of Soviet troops. See especially the Speches of Sandor Kopacsi, Imre Mécs, Victor Orban. 
It has been remarked that the applause stirred by Orban’s speech could be found in the tenor of the 
presentation and he fact he represented the future generations of Hungarians at the time. Karl P. Benziger, 
“The Funeral of Imre Nagy: Contested History and the Power of Memory Culture,” History and Memory, 
12, 2 (Fall/Winter, 2000): 152-153. See also: Richard R. Weiner, “Discourse and Argument in Instituting 
the Governance of Social Law,” Central European Political Science Review, 5, 15 (2005): 6-34. 
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The collective conscience can be seen not as external to each conscience, but immanent 
within it. This is based on the phenomenologists’ of “intentionality:” the conscience 
exists as a tension towards that which is beyond it and resists it; consciousness is 
consciousness of something. Contrary to Durkheim’s “classical” conception of the 
individual consciences closed up within them, and passively receiving external and 
objective representations of the collective conscience, Georges Gurvitch’s notion of the 
collective conscience is presentative. By virtue of the latently open conscience, there can 
be interpenetration or participation of consciences, immanent within each conscience.26  
 
Moving beyond the more morphological structuralism of Durkheim and Halbwachs we 
are moved to ask, “To what extent does the June 16, 1989 memorial serve as a collective 
memory sigifier?” this addresses Pierre Bourdieu’s poststructural critique—the need to 
move beyond a focus on the categorical to one of texts, forms of life and their 
effects/affects.27  
 
These themes are developed by Gilles Deleuze, who moves beyond the inter-subjectivity 
orientation of Gurvitch (and Habermas/Ricoeur today), to the affect/effect of 
constellations of “subject positions,” “zones of indetermination and experimentations” - -  
where things may go off in unforeseen directions or work in unregulated ways.28 
 
Deleuze following Bergson moves beyond representation to memory and 
desire/remembering and yearning. The historicization of the experience of time and 
memory are not understandable as coherent wholes, but open to critique and 
deconstruction.29 Collective memory is the presence of the past in public. And the flows 
of desire re-cathect to images – movement images and time images. These are the 
stutters, the hesitations, the moments of rapture and fragmentation, the prolonged 
duration (durée), the juxtapositions, the flashbacks, the flash-forwards, the perception of 
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 Symbols are the mediation between the content of the signification intended, and the collective actors 
involved. Such symbols can veil the communication they seek to disclose and so hinder participation in it. 
Gurvitch believed that there are depth levels of social reality below the symbolic levels that are 
spontaneous, innovating and creative in nature and ontologically prior as the foundation of any social 
framework of knowledge. See: Georges Gurvitch, The Social Frameworks of Knowledge, translated by 
M.A. and K. A. Thompson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971) supplement, 231-234. It is a social interaction that 
Alfred Schultz saw as essential to all communication: “a mutual tuning-in relation” by which I and Thou 
are expressed by the participants as a “We.” See chapter nine especially pages 214-217 in Alfred Schultz, 
On Phenomenology and Social Relations, Helmut O. Wagner, ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1970). Gurvitch asserts that beneath all forms of collective attitudes, organizations, patterns, signs, 
roles, and symbols, there exists a sphere of collective behavior, ideas, and values, and at the most profound 
level: the collective conscience.   
27
 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, translated by, R. Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977). 
28
 See: Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonianism, translated by H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (New York: Zone 
Books, 1988), Pure Innocence, translated by A. Boyman (New York: Zone Books, 2002), and Difference et 
repetition (Paris: universitaires de France, 1969). 
29
 See for example, Reinhart Kosalleck, Vergangene Zukunft Zur Smantic geschichtkicher Zeiten (1979) 
(Futures Past: On Historical Semantics of Historical Time, translated by Keith Tribe (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1985). 
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time not just as chronology.30 They involve what Derrida calls “spectral” or ghostly 
remembrance – as presence that counters an absence, caused by suppressing, forgetting, 
repressing, and/or traumatically sealing off.31 They never die; they are always to come - - 
and to come back. Memory traces. Flows of desire, Flows of movement, Flows of time, 
Unconscious wishes, Suppressed pasts, Haunting specters. The desire to make meanings, 
The desire to make narratives and myths. Conjuring up hidden pictures, Signifiers of 
desire and attachment. 
 
Deleuze frames movement images and time images in a manner that recalls the 
disemptive method of Georges Sorel:32   
  
• foregoing an attempt to grasp a thing in toto/resisting any tendency to discover 
internally consistent totality; and  
• viewing totality from various vantage points, rather than seeking the single focus 
from which totality can be taken in.  
  
Diremptions differ from Weberian ideal types in that they do not set out to present 
internally consistent ideal pictures or repetitive causal occurrences or sequences of 
events. They take us from one plateau to another. 
  
Unlike Durkheim, Halbwachs or Gurvitch, poststructuralism presents memory culture not 
as a field of  reflective representation, but as a field of traces– as an assemblage 
establishing connection between  multiplicities, between deconstructable moments of 
experience without ever providing an assured final resting place for a reflection on 
ourselves.33 We are moved by poststructuralism from the use of concepts of role-playing 
and role-taking (la langue)  -- to an understanding of the concept of “positioning,” that is, 
the ways in which subjectivity is positioned in discursive practices ( le langage).34   
  
The recollected text is a field of recombinatory elements for novel imaginative projecting 
and instituting.  The constellation of discursive subject positions exist as arcs and 
trajectories - - as a predicate logic with unfulfilled commitments and claims.  Along this 
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 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement Image, translated by H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989) and Gilled Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time Image, 
translated by H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989). 
31
 See for example, Jacques Derrida, Spectres of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and 
the New International, translated by P. Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994). 
32
 See John J. Cerullo, “A Literary Sorel: Disrempting a Fin de Siecle Moralist,” History of Political 
Thought, 24, 1 (2003): 130 and H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society, revised edition (New York: 
Random House Vintage, 1977) 92-93, 173.   
33
 In The Deleuze Connections (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000) chapter one footnote 11 John Rajchman cites 
Isaac Joseph, “Gabriel Tarde: Le monde comme féerie,”Oeuvres de Gabriel Tarde, vol. 4, pp. 9ff in an 
anthology edited by Eric Alliez, Empecheurs de penser eu rond (Paris, 1999). Rajchman sees the Joseph 
piece as “Deleuze inspired,”in developing Deleuze’s idea of Tarde “as inventor of micro-sociology -- in 
opposition to Durkheim’s holism and historicism.”Tarde is presented in a Bergsonian context where he 
“discovers another kind of space and time of belief and desire.” 
34
 Rom Harre and Bronwyn Davies, “Positioning: the Discursive Production of Selves,” Journal for the 
Theory of Social Behavior, 20, 1 (1991): 44-63; Rom Harre and Luk van Langehove, Positioning Theory 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1998); Jacob Torfing, New Theories of Discourse: Ladau, Mouffe and Zizek (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1999). 
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arc of subject positions, relations are constantly being dissolved, recast, and reformulated 
so that an identity emerges and is not discovered.   
  
Diremptive scanning reveals floating signifiers that have not delivered on their 
commitments.  They are positioned within narratives not as sedimented moments or static 
snapshots, but as panning shots of a collective identity/collective conscience in motion. 
 
III 
 
October 23, 2006 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution and was 
marked by the Hungarian public being denied access from much of the public state ritual 
that had been broadly advertised prior to the event.35 The Parliament had been cordoned 
off and the official flag raising ceremony that began the day’s events was attended only 
by guests and the diplomatic corps. As if to underline the emptiness of what had been the 
epicenter of mass mobilization fifty years past a televised broadcast later that day 
revealed dancers performing to an empty square in front of the Parliament.36 Instead of a 
demonstration of political unity as revealed by Nagy’s funeral in 1989 the event was 
marked by deep political divisions that included a separate commemoration staged by the 
Socialist’s main opposition party FIDESZ (Young Democrats). Indeed, mass 
participation was revealed only in the FIDESZ event attended by over 100,000.  
Demonstrations and violence erupted in the streets and were met head on by the police 
with one confrontation ending only in the early hours of the next day.  
 
Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany of the Socialist Party and President László 
Sólyam who had been a founding member of the center right Hungarian Democratic 
Forum (MDF) claimed it was their intention to celebrate fiftieth anniversary 
commemorations of the Revolution with the entire country. Jenö Fonay a revolutionary 
and member of the Emlékévet Elıkészitı Bizottság (Committee to Prepare for the 
Anniversary Year) asserted that the statue being erected on the site where one to Joseph 
Stalin had stood until torn down by the Revolutionaries would bring a renewed sense of 
solidarity among the Hungarian people. Underlying these assertions of unity, however, 
was a sense of bitterness that threatened to dilute the plans for a unified celebration. 
Speaking on the occasion of the annual commemoration held for Imre Nagy on June 16, 
2006 Mária Wittner a revolutionary and member of FIDESZ bitterly criticized what she 
claimed was a false sense of unity asserting that “we are not going to assist in the 
preparations for the commemorations [in this context].” Raising the well worn linkage 
between the Socialist Party and the former Communist Party she stated, “Those who 
suppressed or assisted in the suppression of the Revolution will have their celebration and 
those righteous people [revolutionaries and those who remained true to those ideals] will 
have their celebrations.”37 Another FIDESZ MP János Horvath who had been a member 
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 For example see “Köszönet a szabadság hıseinek, 1956-2006 (Thank you to the heroes of freedom),” 
Népszabadság, 21 October 2006, 10. The events began on October 21 and continued through November 4. 
36
 Fireworks that took place later in the evening could only be viewed on the public television see: Zsolt 
Gréczy, “Zárt kapuk mögött, méltósággal (Behind closed doors with dignity),” Népszabadság, 24 October, 
2006, 2.  
37
 Zsolt Gréczy, “Két ünnepre készül a jobboldal?” (Does the right wing prepare for two celebrations?), 
Népszabadság, 16 June, 2006, 3. 
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of Nagy’s government hoped that differences could yet be put aside for the sake of the 
momentous national occasion. And yet, at the time of the memorial former FIDESZ 
Prime Minister Victor Orbán had remained silent and FIDESZ did not organize a 
memorial for the occasion giving the impression that Nagy embodied ideas only for the 
left center parties.38  
 
In the wake of the Socialist victory in the Spring of 2006 questions of economy 
dominated the Hungarian’s attention as the Socialist/SZDSZ coalition unrolled an agenda 
that proposed severe cutbacks in health and education to the chagrin of the public.39 The 
election like the one held in 2002 was close in both rounds of voting.40 The opposition 
seethed over what they viewed was a purposeful subversion of democracy made plain by 
the withholding of critical information regarding Hungary’s economic health during the 
first and second rounds of voting. Discussions and problems regarding the fiftieth 
anniversary commemorations were placed in the background as the public discussed and 
debated the economic program forwarded by the majority. 
 
On Saturday September 16, 2006 a stunned nation listened to the broadcast of a leaked 
tape that captured Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány admitting in a closed door session of 
the Socialist faction that his Party had lied about the state of the economy. The effect was 
immediate. Demonstrators primarily from the center right opposition parties gathered the 
next day at Kossuth Square, and the demonstrations continued day and night through the 
evening of October 22. FIDESZ responded to the Prime Minister’s announcement by 
insisting that he resign based on his lack of veracity with the public.41 The size of the 
crowd ebbed and flowed, and swelled to the size of tens of thousands at major events 
sponsored by FIDESZ that included speakers and music.  
 
Protestors moved from Kossuth Square to the headquarters of the National television on 
Monday September 18, 2006, taking up in the downstairs foyer. The demonstrators were 
ultimately driven out, but not before they set several cars on fire and damaging the 
building.42 The violence and the vandalism was apparently the work of an extreme right 
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 After the crowd was driven away from the building they attacked a monument commemorating the 
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(They attacked the MTV, even the opposition parties can not control the situation, what will happen 
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wing faction associated with a soccer club, although a FIDESZ representative was 
spotted among the crowd. Victor Orbán, co-founder of FIDESZ, disavowed the use of 
violence and distanced himself and his party away from the incident at the television 
station and other instances of violence in the streets that occurred later that week. But the 
Socialists quickly countered that FIDESZ in its support for the demonstrations in front of 
the Parliament and confrontational demands that Gyucsány step down were in fact 
encouraging the more extremist right wing elements that had attached themselves to the 
demonstration. Indeed, some demonstrators carried flags emblazoned with the Royal 
Coat of Arms, and the red and silver Árpád flag that had been incorporated into the 
fascist Arrow Cross flags and the end of World War II. Some even voiced their demand 
for the restoration of the Királyság (Hungarian Kingdom) before its dismemberment after 
World War II.43     
 
Neither Gyurcsány nor Orbán were willing to back down and both jockeyed for political 
advantage. The countrywide elections for local governments on October 1 provided the 
opposition with an opportunity to gauge public dissatisfaction with the Socialist coalition 
and their economic program. During the run up to the election FIDESZ leaders energized 
their base with demands for Gyurcsány’s resignation. The mayor of Debrecen suggested 
that local leaders be given the power to veto governmental budgets in order to “help 
Hungarians defend their towns and cities against the Prime Minister.” Orbán hoped that if 
the Socialists lost they would be forced to give up on the Socialist economic program.44  
 
The rhetoric became even more heated as election-day approached. At a rally in mid 
September Orbán stated “We need every single vote so we could begin moving against 
the government…Once they have the results of the Revolution [election]…they [the 
opposition in Parliament] can stand up to the government in a radical deliberate way…the 
foundation to stand up against the government must be laid by the people.” Gyurcsány 
pounced, “Orbán is questioning the legitimacy of the government…we can have a debate 
about everything, government decisions, promises…But to promote radical 
resistance…steps over the line…Today the President of FIDESZ crossed over the 
Rubicon.”45 If Gyurcsány’s proposed cutbacks to Hungarian’s social security had enraged 
the populace, his revelations on September 16 sealed the deal and the Socialists took a 
beating at the polls.46 Gyurcsány all but ignored calls for his resignation and his coalition 
remained firm in their promotion for austerity. He instead requested of vote of confidence 
from the Parliament on October 2, 2006. 
                                                                                                                                                 
today)?” Népszava, 19 Septmeber, 2006, 1-2 and Összecsapás a tévé elıtt (Riot in front of the television 
station),” Népszabadság, 19 September, 2006, 1.  
43
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 Dávid Trencséni, “Vakhit (Blind belief),” 168 óra, 18, 36 (7 September, 2006): 10-11. 
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 The FIDESZ victory at the mayoral and county level was decisive. Though SZDSZ/MSZP and MSZP 
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FIDESZ won decisive county majorities in all but Budapest and Heves county. See: Népszava, 2 October, 
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Orbán responded to Gyurcsány by demanding that the Socialists dismiss Gyurcsány from 
office within 72 hours. Orbán dismissed Gyurcsány’s request for a vote of confidence 
saying that this was “an old trick,” what was really needed was a vote of censure.47 The 
vote was a foregone conclusion for the center left coalition, 207-165, with 12 abstentions. 
The vote was followed by an apology of sorts from the Prime Minister. He apologized 
that “…they [the Socialists] had tried to avoid simple answers…they did not speak 
honestly with the people.” Gyurcsány continued by apologizing for his use of “harsh and 
rude language” that many found offensive. He also defended himself against the 
accusations that the government had cheated and knowingly misled the people in 
connection with the national elections the previous spring. He then launched into a frontal 
attack against Orbán stating “…the debate in Parliament is an attempt by the minority to 
attack the constitution…their goal is to force early elections…and [once in power] 
rewrite the constitution to Viktor Orbán’s taste.”48 It was in this atmosphere that FIDESZ 
spokesman Péter Szijjártó announced that they would not participate in any of the 
planned commemorations in which the Prime Minister was scheduled to speak. FIDESZ 
would only attend ceremonies where the President would speak as he represented a 
symbol of national unity. The final blow came with the announcement that FIDESZ 
would hold a separate commemoration on October 23.49  
  
In this poisoned atmosphere the FIDESZ demonstrations in front of the Parliament 
replete with calls for the Prime Minister’s resignation and the “Revolution” of October 
served to fold the contemporary political crisis into the memorialization of what was the 
pivotal event of Hungary’s twentieth century history. Who were the inheritors of 1956?  
 
Discussion of 1956 and the principal actors like Imre Nagy can easily melt into an 
evaluation of the communist period. Though committed to a unified celebration of the 
Revolution President László Sólyam expressed his unease with Nagy and his 
confederates when he stated, “It’s up to the youth to create a holiday on October 23 like 
that on March 15…we have almost everything for that…even if we do not have symbolic 
individuals like Petıfi and Kossuth…”50 The Revolutionaries of 1848 present less 
controversy as they are portrayed as remaining steadfast to the ideals of the of the liberal 
revolution to the end. Though utilized for different political ends the events and players 
of 1848 have been highlighted by Hungarian governments since the establishment of the 
Dual Monarchy in 1867. Even the Stalinist state included the glorious story of the 
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 14 
revolution in secondary school textbooks, albeit with a Stalinist interpretation tagged on 
at the end. 1848 provides a certain consensus that legitimizes the actions of its heroes, 
unlike the historical actors of 1956 whose actions are interwoven in the past and 
present.51 
 
As we have reviewed former revolutionaries themselves were divided over the idea of 
reconciliation. In the politics of the new Republic of 1989 the right wing factions 
proposed various narrative strands from the past that portrayed the communist period as 
an aberration not reflective of the national spirit. In this guise the leader of Hungary’s 
interwar regime, Miklos Horthy 1920-1944 is recognized for his steadfast stand against 
Bolshevism and preservation of Hungary’s independence. Hungary’s alliance with the 
Axis powers and Horthy’s role in the holocaust is either downplayed or ignored.52 
Likewise Socialists and other center left parties see themselves as inheritors of Nagy’s 
social reforms. His Stalinist past is in part shrouded by his association with land reform 
following World War II that was a common goal of the majority parties of the short lived 
Republic 1945-1948. Further complicating this story was the common goal among many 
within the dominant Smallholders Party and governing coalition that included the 
communists to rid Hungary of its fascist strand. The problem lay in the fact that the 
Soviets and their Hungarian cohorts used this purge in their bid to create a one party 
state. Politicians regularly resurrect the past in order to bludgeon their opponents.  
 
The historian Zoltán Ripp has suggested that from the perspective of the second Soviet 
attack against the revolutionaries on November 4, it is possible to portray the Revolution 
selectively as a War of National Liberation where focus is placed on the heroism of the 
streets and as an uprising against communism.53 This has also served the needs of those 
distancing themselves from Nagy and his fellow communist reformers.54  
 
According to journalist Ildikó Hankó, “We will need many decades to understand that the 
true heroes were not those thinking within reform [Imre Nagy and his confederates], but 
the young ones [street fighters] whose natural instinct was for freedom.”55 The terror 
enacted by Kádár very deliberately targeted workers and adolescents who had fought 
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alongside them.56 For some within the spectrum of the center right coalition it remained 
galling that former members of Kádár’s regime were still actively engaged in politics and 
desired what they considered a completion of the goals of the Revolution that included 
purging communists from government.57 The question of lustration had been raised in 
1989 and in response to the demand for a more radical regime change József Antall 
replied, “[you] should have fomented Revolution.”58 In 2006 scores remained unsettled.  
    
The demonstrations continued right up to the weekend that the official State 
commemorations were to begin. Initially the demonstrators had been told that they would 
have to clear the square by midnight Friday October 20. At the last minute the authorities 
changed their minds and instead erected a barricade that cut off the demonstrator’s sight 
line to the area where the ceremonies would take place.59 In response, demonstrators 
threatened to use their amplifiers to drown out the commemorations taking place on the 
other side of the barricade. Then, early in the morning of October 23, the police used the 
pretext of a security search to ensure the safety of the foreign delegation attending the 
ceremonies that day, and cleared the demonstrators off the square.60 The square was 
sealed off from the public with a fence manned by the police. A series of noisy but small 
demonstrations ensued later that morning resulting in the police expanding the security 
zone around the Parliament.  
 
Commemorations did take place, but with the public in most cases kept at a distance for 
fear of violent disruption. The exclusive nature of the official celebrations was a sharp 
contrast to the mass participation that was the mark of the actual Revolution, and a 
photograph of the Prime Minister performing kegyelet at the new monument to the 
Revolution during the dedication ceremony seemed to heighten this fact.61 Even more 
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bizarre were a series of performances at the Parliament that took place with no audience. 
During the performances a television camera panned an empty Kossuth Square.62  
    
This pattern continued throughout the next two weeks and concluded on the evening of 
November 4. The final event of the commemorations that took place on Heroes Square 
was the wreathing of the tomb of the Unknown Soldier in honor of those Revolutionaries 
who had died fighting for their country.63 Prior to the ceremony the public was told via 
loudspeaker to leave as the official commemoration was about to begin. The Prime 
Minister, his guests, and a military honor guard alone in the square conveyed a message 
far different from the message that briefly informed the Hungarian polity on June 16, 
1989. 
 
Where did everybody go on October 23? A counter commemoration was sponsored by 
FIDESZ and KDNP at Astoria, the site of bitter fighting during the Revolution. A crowd 
of over 100,000 showed up, and included many families with children. The speeches 
were fiery in their denunciation of the Gyurcsány and the Socialist coalition. FIDESZ and 
the Christian Democrats proposed that a referendum in which education, pensions, health 
care, and what they identified as democratic guarantees should be presented to the 
Hungarian people. Orbán proclaimed, “This [the referendum] will seal the fate of the 
government based on lies.” He explained that by lying about the economy during the 
spring elections they had “cheated us…they took away the right of free elections…the 
right that was achieved by the heirs of 1956.” The impassioned speech hearkened back to 
the tactics FIDESZ and SZDSZ had used to push the communists out of power in 1989. 
He concluded, “1956 was a miracle in its birth, short life and death…it happened in a 
country tortured twice by the greatest lie of the twentieth century, Socialism!”64 The 
speech concluded with thunderous applause by an enthusiastic audience unaware that the 
police were driving a violent demonstration in their direction.     
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A group of several thousand noisy demonstrators confronted the police on Károly körút, 
which is part of the inner ring of Pest and not far from Astoria. The violence was 
reminiscent of clashes that had characterized the week of September 18, except this time 
the police were much more aggressive in their use of tear gas, water canons, and rubber 
bullets. Orbán had again distanced himself from the violence and instructed those 
attending the commemoration to do so as well. The demonstrators cast themselves as 
inheritors of the Revolution and were not to be quelled. Their nationalist banners pointed 
to the recidivist politics of the extreme right wing, and yet there was also a certain feeling 
of anarchy to the event. At one point several young men commandeered a Russian tank 
that had been on display and drove through the streets adding to the unreality of the 
scene.65 The riot ultimately wound up near Erzsébet Bridge with the police and 
demonstrators doing battle until the early hours of October 24. Accusations abounded 
that the police had trapped innocents in their cordon, including some of those who 
attended the FIDESZ event at Astoria only a few blocks away.66 
 
Denying the public the opportunity to participate in the State commemorations certainly 
played into the hands of the Socialist’s opponents. But what of the many who had stayed 
at home? Many Hungarians were disconcerted to see a building that had been beautifully 
restored after the Revolution being damaged. Further the chaos in the streets and 
demonstrators mocking the police with chants of AVH from behind barricades served to 
alienate many. What FIDESZ might have gained by Gyurcsány’s revelations seemed to 
be somewhat thwarted by a public disgruntled by the violence. Finally, though many 
Hungarians sympathized with the FIDESZ critique of the Socialist’s economic program, 
their accord with the various aspects of the right wing agenda was dubious.  
 
At a conference held at the Italian Institute of Culture in Budapest on September 28, 2006 
Jenı Fónay provided an account of the fighting at Széna Square, his relationship with 
Péter Mansfeld, and his time in prison. Fónay’s anti-communist views are well known 
and he wrote passionately regarding the Socialist appropriation of Imre Nagy prior to the 
parliamentary debate over the Memory Bill. And yet, at the conference he underscored 
the connection between Imre Nagy and the Revolutionaries, echoing Ottó Sándorfy’s 
assertions that the two can not be separated.67 He was among many former 
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Revolutionaries who accepted honors from the Hungarian government and on October 22 
shook hands in the Parliament with both the President László Sólyom and Prime Minister 
Ferenc Gyucsány. This act of reconciliation was not followed by all present, but indicated 
the possibility that the commemorations signified.68 
    
IV 
 
Dominick LaCapra claims that the generalizations found in competing narratives pose a 
danger in the ability of a society to “come to terms with the past.”69 Societies that have 
experienced trauma and violence are often thought to require a re-birthing in order to 
come to terms with what has happened-to face its truth and “work through it.” LaCapra 
has repeatedly emphasized how the psychoanalytical concept of “working through” is 
essential to any adequate understanding and response to trauma.70 In The Origin of 
German Tragic Drama / Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, Walter Benjamin talks of 
chasing spirits back into their bodies, and redeeming them through law. In discussing 
these German “mourning plays” (Trauerspiels), Gillian Rose recalls the burial of the 
Athenian general Phocion, unjustly executed and slandered. His wife – determined to 
mourn his death and provide proper burial rites beyond the city walls of Athens – ate his 
ashes, giving them a proper burial, incarnating him. Rites of mourning extend into hope 
for the future, for new attachments and for re-engagement with life.71 LaCapra points us 
to a third option. This is more self questioning meta-narrative--one which helps us to gain 
critical distance from the trauma and collective effervescence associated with it so that 
we can assume responsibility in dealing with it.72  
  
The Nagy memorials ultimately refer to how we participate in the tragedy of Nagy’s 
execution. It is in the tradition of the lamentation and spectacle of the Central European 
mourning play that Benjamin critically analyzed in the middle 1920’s. This is a tradition 
that Benjamin saw as dissolving the tragic into spectacle.73  
  
Beyond the mourning, Benjamin argues, can we transcend the spectacle of shared 
suffering, shared melancholy, and shared atonement? Can we do so in a meaningful and 
knowing participation in the tragic, not as a closed drama based on myth, oracular 
mystery, martyrdom or the un-interred corpse? Can we do so as an incomplete and 
unfolding drama characterized not by a sense of redemptive finality, but by an ongoing 
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redemptive critique – with a collective conscience that history might have been different 
and can be different? 
  
Narratives enable us to grapple with the ambiguity, the diversity, the discontinuity and 
the mystery that comes with our being in the world, and with the collective memory that 
comes with being. To an extent, the collective representations involved in the 
reconstruction of knowledge within a narrative may reveal an immanent propositional 
content of the way we negotiate our world and our humanity.  Narrative attempts to 
provide closure to some sense of our being in the world.  In so doing, narratives 
foreshadow, backshadow, and side shadow.  As readers [or viewers], we need to guard 
against illusory or mythic unifying narratives. 
  
The dead refuse to go away.  They stir up dread and haunting - - until their promise is 
fulfilled and their narrative is completed, “until their stories register.”74 Events, images, 
memories, and explanations are conjured up diremptively.  There is both a collective 
forgetting in overcoming trauma by confining it to oblivion;75 and there is a collective 
remembering. 
 
Piacular Subjectivity and Collective Conscience, as Charles Lemert notes,76 are ghost 
concepts that live on, haunting us, refusing to go away, open to revision. Piacular 
subjectivity as a collective conscience could be understood as the master narrative from 
which the aforementioned meta-narratives derive.  Thus, piacular subjectivity can be 
understood as the depth level narrative relations of moral conscience shared collectively - 
- both in terms of a need to recollect and recognize transgressions/sins, and a need to 
atone for them. 
  
Yet our attempt at narrating the piacular subjectivity involved in the funeral reveal less of 
a master narrative, and more of a field of traces - - both representational and non-
representational images and practices. 
  
What we have re-collected and revealed is a text of yearning and longing for a Hungarian 
collective identity in the practices and movements of historical groups.  That text reveals 
a great deal of presence of absence, and a field of recombinatory images, ideas and 
yearnings open to diverse re-assembling.  
  
In closing, we may also ponder the events of October 23, 2006. Specifically, we may 
consider the extent to which the piacular subjectivity studied in the Hungarian context 
can fragment into an extremism that can be characterized as a baroque subjectivity: the 
mournful and melancholy evocation of a sense of passion and ecstasy, the assaulting of 
the senses and the emotions rather than the invocation of resignifying commitments that 
relate past moments to the present and future ones, as well as to a rebirth. A baroque 
subjectivity can manifest the weakness of a core collective conscience: marked by the 
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grotesque, the bizarre (barroco in Portuguese); and positioned between a melancholic 
despair and the dizzying, inhabited by ghosts, zombies, and the dead, bleeding both into 
the past and into the future.77  
 
The historian Saul Frielander has commented that when examining a contested historical 
event that includes the memories of living political actors the line between memory and 
historical reality is blurred. Constructing a narrative in this context is enhanced by the 
memories of victims, perpetrators, and bystanders who then shed light on an event as 
interested parties.78 The bitter struggle that marked the fiftieth anniversary 
commemoration called upon specters and traces from the past in an attempt to manipulate 
the event to accord with political ends rather than a detailed accounting of the event that 
would reveal the complexity and ambiguity associated with the event. The focus on 
political ends shrouded rather than highlighted contemplation on this contested history 
dampening the possibility for the reconciliation hoped for by the planners of the 
commemoration. The national narratives of the 1848 and 1956 Revolutions found in 
school texts provide a certain consensus regarding the heroism and righteousness of these 
events. The stories found in more advanced texts actually make an attempt to engage the 
complexity of these events and provide evidence of a collectively shared story. But the 
possibilities presented by these narratives are occluded by the ideologies we have 
identified and their differing portrayals of these histories, providing a counterpoint that 
has yet to find resolution.79 Myth provides answers without ever explicitly posing a 
problem, specifying an argument, or developing a demonstration. It may be that a certain 
resolution/reconciliation can come only as the actors of this drama leave the political 
stage. The liberal society that lies at the heart of 1848 and 1956 were realized only for a 
brief moment before being repressed. The generation that only now is coming to its full is 
the first to live fully in the context of a democratic state, what stories will they write?  
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